The three basic elements of our national-level simulation model are (1) a previously developed stochastic agent-based model for disease spread at the community level; (2) detailed U.S. Census demographics and worker flow data for daily commuter traffic at short distances, and Bureau of Transportation Statistics data for the less frequent longrange travel behavior; and (3) high-performance parallel computing expertise in modeling millions to billions of particles on hundreds to thousands of processors. These three components, each of which we describe next in some detail, are brought together to provide a unique capability for a detailed modeling of disease spread in the United States population.
influenza virus to be possible between these two individuals in this social setting. The probability of transmission given such contact, P trans , is a single scalar number which multiplies each contact probability, allowing for a simple variation in contagiousness (typically represented by the basic reproductive number, R 0 ) without modifying the underlying social interaction network parameters. We do not allow for any seasonal or weekly variation in contact rates or transmission probability, and no births or non-flurelated deaths are included in our model.
Each day, the probability of infection for each susceptible individual is computed based on the transmission probabilities for each potential infectious contact, p i = P trans × c i . If the infectious contact is receiving antiviral treatment, this transmission probability is further multiplied by (1 -AVE i ), where AVE i is the antiviral efficacy for infectiousness.
Similarly, if they have been vaccinated, the vaccine efficacy for infectiousness VE i reduces the transmission probability by (1 -VE i ). The transmission probability p i can be further reduced for asymptomatic (yet infectious) contacts, as described in the next section. The probability of a susceptible person becoming infected is then computed as a product of all of the possible infectious contacts each day. number; if this number is less than P, the susceptible adult becomes infected and enters the latent phase of infection. If desired, the source of infection can then be determined by sampling from the relative contributions of each infectious contact to P (for instance, in this example an infection is most likely to be transmitted from the household child, but all 5 infectious contacts have a finite probability of being identified as the source).
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Disease natural history
We employ the same influenza natural history model as used previously (4) , which for completeness is recapitulated in Fig. 3 . The main points are that the latent, incubation, and contagious period durations are each sampled from discrete distributions, with mean periods of 1.2, 1.9, and 4.1 days, respectively. (The contagious period includes both the slight difference between latent and incubation periods, as well as the standard postincubation period when symptoms appear in 67% of infected people.) Any infectiousness that is not accompanied by overt symptoms (namely, the post-latent part of the incubation period, if any, and the 33% of infected people who never develop symptoms) is assumed to be half as great as the infectiousness of symptomatic individuals, reducing the transmission probability p i by a factor of two.
As before (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) , we also allow people who become ill to withdraw from all contact groups except their household, with an age-dependent withdrawal probability and distribution of the number of days of illness before withdrawal for influenza taken from
Elveback et al (1).

Pandemic influenza model parameterization
The potential pandemic influenza strain was assumed to have an age-dependent attack rate pattern between the historical 1957-8 "Asian" influenza A (H2N2) (6) and 1968-9 "Hong Kong" influenza A (H3N2) (7) pandemic strains (see Table 4 ). For fitting purposes the attack rate pattern was calculated as an average of the final state of 500 independent communities that initially had 12 random infected people each (Fig. 4) . As a baseline the contact rates in households, small play groups, and large day care centers were taken from (3) where an H2N2 strain was modeled. However, since this attack rate pattern hits school-age children particularly hard (see Table 4 ), these rates had to be reduced by about a factor of 3 (this is also evident in (4), where a similar attack rate pattern was fit to a model specific for Thailand). The rest of the contact contribution was split between the remaining four contact groups (workgroups, household cluster, neighborhood, and community). Fine tuning to generate the contact probabilities shown in Table 3 was done by calculating the gradient vectors for the different age dependent attack rates with respect to the contact rate parameters, which gives a linear approximation of the dependence of the attack rates as a function of the contact rates.
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Although the fitting was merely done for isolated communities, we find that the national model has a very similar attack rate pattern (see Table 4 ).
(2) Data Sources
The fundamental geographic unit in our model is the census tract, which is defined as a relatively stable geographic area with between 1,500 and 8,000 residents, with an optimum size of 4,000 people. In the 2000 Census, there were 65,443 census tracts containing 281,421,906 people in the United States (50 states and District of Columbia), corresponding to an average population of 4,300 per tract (see Fig. 5 for the actual distribution of population sizes) * . We round off the population of each tract to the nearest 2,000 persons, and populate each tract with the appropriate number of 2,000-person communities, each with households, schools, and other mixing groups as described above. In addition, several urban tracts have little or no residential population, but a large daytime worker population. We model these by communities comprised solely of work groups (in addition to the broad but weak community-level mixing), with an average of five 20-person work groups per each such community (corresponding to the average number of work groups in the suburban community model). In this way we are able to realistically differentiate primarily residential tracts (with few, if any, work groups) from primarily urban ones (including some with few or even zero households). Each of the 180,492 model communities making up the national model is stochastically generated in an independent manner, so that no two communities within the nation are exactly identical.
Workplace tracts are chosen using the tract-to-tract worker flow data from the 2000 Census † , which also provides the total number of working (and conversely, of unemployed) adults in each tract. The distribution of home-to-work commuter distances (measured from one tract center to another, and zero if the home and work tracts are identical) is shown in Fig. 5 . We note that this raw data refers to where individuals were working during the Census 2000 reference week (generally the last week of March 2000), which is why a significant number of people (1.13 million, or 0.9% of the total workforce) were reported as working at locations 100 miles or more from their residence.
We assume that such travel does not occur on a daily basis, and instead place these 
B. Scenario
We assume that the pandemic influenza strain is introduced into the United States via arriving international passengers. Furthermore, we assume that by the time of this introduction there is an ongoing worldwide pandemic, so that there is no particular country or region which can be isolated (for instance, restricting arriving international flights from Southeast Asia). Consequently, we consider the 14 largest international airport gateways (14) in the continental United States (see Table 6 ), and introduce a small number of infected individuals each day. We do so by choosing a random tract and community within each county listed in Table 6 , and randomly infect between 0 and N individuals (chosen randomly from a uniform distribution) in that community. We take N proportional to the number of international arrivals at each airport, assuming 1-10 potential infecteds per 10,000 daily passengers. This represents a group of individuals, such as a family or business travelers, flying into the U.S. from the assumed pandemic Germann, Kadau, Longini, and Macken
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C. Basic Reproductive Number R 0
The value of R 0 was calculated for different transmission probabilities by three different methods, yielding the results summarized in Table 7 . The first method was to average the number of secondary infections (omitting any tertiary infections) in 128,000 isolated communities that each had one random index case within the 2,000-person community population. (Using a smaller number of realizations, up to several thousand, led to statistical errors too great to determine R 0 within the desired ±0.1 precision.) An example of this calculated distribution and the resulting average R 0 are shown for P trans = 0.12 in Fig. 6 , and these results are denoted "random index case" in Table 7 .
The second method was similar, except that separate R 0 first were calculated for index cases belonging to each of the 5 age groups (see Table 7 ). The overall R 0 was then calculated as an average of these age group-dependent R 0 values, weighted by the age dependent attack rate pattern for the respective transmission probability (referred to as the "attack rate pattern weighted index case" in Table 7 ). By doing this, the index case is more "typical" of those hit hardest by the outbreak, and as expected, this method slightly increases the value of R 0 (particularly for low R 0 ).
The last method is an approximation based on the slope of the cumulative number of cases (15) and allows also for a time dependence of the reproductive number
, where ν is the sum of the latent and infectious periods, which for our model is 1.2 + 4.1 = 5.3 days, f is the relative duration of the latent period (i.e., . Although there are large oscillations at early times due to the larger statistical errors (from fewer cases), it is clearly noticeable that R is largest at early times, and drops later. This is related to the fact that school children are particularly important spreaders in the initial stages of an influenza outbreak (see Fig. 7 ) due to their strong household and school interactions, which then naturally enhances R (see Table   Germann , Kadau, Longini, and Macken
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D. Intervention Strategies (1) Targeted Antiviral Prophylaxis (TAP)
Upon activation of a TAP program, symptomatic individuals and their close contacts are treated with antiviral drugs, until a possibly limited national stockpile has been exhausted. We assume that X% of symptomatic cases can be identified, and that one day after the onset of illness, the sick individual is treated therapeutically and prophylaxis offered to his/her close contacts. Of these, we assume that 100% of household, household cluster, preshool, and playgroup contact are identified and treated, and that Y% of workgroup and elementary, middle, and high school contacts are identified and treated. For the present work, we will focus on two cases: X = Y = 60% or 80%, and refer to these as "60% TAP" and "80% TAP", respectively.
As in other recent models of pandemic influenza (4), we use reported estimates of the antiviral efficacy for oseltamivir (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) . Specifically, we assume that the antiviral efficacy for susceptibility AVE s = 0. course becomes ill, they complete their current course at the increased 2 tablets/day dosage. We assume that full antiviral efficacy is attained with the first tablet, and that there is no residual efficacy once the course has been completed.
(2) Dynamic mass vaccination
Two major uncertainties in modeling any vaccination program are how effective the vaccine will be (as even for endemic influenza, it is typically matched against a strain which is several months to a year old), and how quickly it can be produced, distributed, and result in an effective immune response. As yet, the efficacy of vaccination against a human-adapted avian strain is unknown. The immunogenicity of experimental vaccines has been measured; it has been found that a four-fold increase in antigen content above that of vaccines against human strains, and two vaccine doses, are required for a rise in antibody titre typically associated with protection (21). We assume that efficacy and immunogenicity are linearly related in our simulations. The second complication is related to timing. The time lag between vaccination and full effectiveness depends on the particular vaccine; for instance, a live attenuated vaccine may produce an antibody response within 1 day, while a killed vaccine may take two weeks. If multiple doses are required, the timescale can be significantly longer; for instance, two doses of a killed vaccine administered four weeks apart means that full efficacy may not be attained until six weeks after the initial dose. Rather than dealing with the specifics of any particular vaccine (including partial efficacy between the administration of the first and second doses), we simply combine this delay time with that for production and distribution, and refer only to the date at which vaccination becomes effective, which may be either before or after the outbreak begins. **
We consider two alternative distribution strategies, either randomly throughout the entire eligible population, or preferentially to children (with any remaining vaccine then distributed among adults). In either case, the eligible population consists of all individuals who have not been vaccinated and are not currently symptomatic. For ** This leads to a minor inconsistency, in that the eligible population is determined at the date at which full effectiveness is reached, and not at the earlier date of vaccination. However, this study is concerned with strategies to minimize the number of infected individuals, in which case the number of new symptomatic cases (who become ineligible for vaccination) between these two dates is negligible.
simplicity, we only consider two alternative production scenarios, either assuming the early distribution of a low-efficacy (e.g., a poorly matched) vaccine or the delayed production of a higher-efficacy vaccine. The well-matched vaccine is assumed to require two doses, and to have a vaccine efficacy for susceptibility VE s = 0.70 (with a reduced VE s = 0.50 for the elderly, age 65+), and a vaccine efficacy for infectiousness VE i = 0.80. The poorly matched vaccine has only VE s = 0.30 (for all age groups) and VE i = 0.50, and is assumed to require only a single dose (which would not be the case for an avian H5N1-based vaccine, for instance (21)). It is assumed that early production of the poorly matched vaccine allows for a vaccination program prior to the outbreak, resulting in a prior coverage of some fraction of the population (again, either uniformly or preferentially to children). For either vaccine, we assume a constant production and distribution rate of 4, 10, or 20 million doses per week nationwide, either starting as soon as two months before the first introduction, to as late as two months after the first introduction. The total production is also assumed to be limited to 50, 100, 250, or 400 million doses.
(3) School closure
Upon recognition of a pandemic strain in the U.S., one of the likely mitigation strategies is the closure of schools (22). We assume that this involves a total nationwide closure all of the school-related mixing groups in our model, and that this closure remains in effect for the duration of the pandemic. The affected mixing groups are the regular preschool-age playgroups, preschools, and elementary, middle, and high schools. All other contact rates remain unchanged.
(4) Social distancing
As a result of either a formal quarantine program, or voluntary changes in social and hygienic behavior in the event of a widespread pandemic, it is likely that normal contact behavior will be affected in times of crisis. Although this alteration is difficult to predict in advance, it almost surely will involve an increased tendency to remain at home rather than in large public places. To approximate this behavioral modification, we assume that the contact rates are cut in half for the community, neighborhood, work group, school, preschool, and playgroup mixing groups; household contact rates are doubled; and household cluster contact rates remain unchanged. As with the other mitigation Germann, Kadau, Longini, and Macken
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(5) Reductions in travel
We consider reductions in both of our travel components: the daily workplace travel and irregular long-range travel. The first may be curtailed by voluntary increases in telecommuting, or in extreme cases by a nationwide work stoppage (with the exception of health care and emergency personnel, as described below). Reductions in longrange travel may also range from a component of the natural social distancing tendency, to an imposed quarantine or travel restriction program. We assume that long-range travel may be reduced to as little as 1% of the normal number of trips.
E. Sensitivity Analyses
In this section we explore the sensitivity to various components of the model, including including the number of antiviral courses required for a TAP intervention) do not depend on the size or distribution of the seeding, the precise details of the spatiotemporal evolution do. This is illustrated for the Los Angeles and New York County seeds in Fig.   9 , showing that very different geographic spreads can yield virtually identical national epidemic curves (Fig. 8 ). to 10% of the normal levels during the entire 180 days of the simulation, for an initial introduction in Los Angeles County. Here it can be seen that the width of the epidemic curve widens and the peak shifts to later times, both useful factors when considering the demand upon the health care system and resource allocation. Even though these reductions reflect nearly a complete halt of nonessential travel (other than local commuter travel to workplaces), with only 1-10% of leakage or essential emergency travel, the total attack rate after 180 days is unchanged. Also shown in Fig. 8 is the Germann, Kadau, Longini, and Macken
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Here one can see that the (already marginal) effectiveness of travel restrictions is reduced even further if the virus is given any time to spread, since it may introduce many small pockets of infection which are able to develop in spite of the draconian measures.
(3) Vaccine production, distribution, and effectiveness delays
Since an intervention strategy of vaccination alone is unlikely to ever succeed for R 0 > 1.9 (see Table 2 ), we show in Table 8 the effectiveness of different production rates, limits, and starting dates, for R 0 = 1.6. In addition to the necessity for both high production rates and limits (which are more important than the exact starting dates), we find a clear advantage to a preferential vaccination of children, as has been suggested recently (23). Perhaps more surprisingly, we find that a more widespread vaccination coverage with a lower efficacy is decidedly more effective than a higher-efficacy vaccination of half as many people (also shown in Fig. 10 ), even before taking into account the additional 4-6 weeks which may be required to elicit a strong immune response from a 2-course vaccine program.
(4) Targeted antiviral prophylaxis: delays in policy implementation and in patient diagnosis
There are two timescales that may affect the effectiveness of a TAP program. The first of these is at the population-wide public health scale, involving the time required to recognize that a nascent pandemic outbreak is underway and implement a public health response. The second timescale is at the individual level, involving the time it takes from the first appearance of symptoms, before the person visits their doctor or urgent care center, to a correct diagnosis and prescription of antiviral treatment for the patient, to prescription and delivery of prophylactic courses to that patient's close contacts. In Fig.   10 we show (for R 0 = 1.9) the increasing number of antiviral courses required, and the increasing attack rate, the longer it takes to initiate a TAP program. (Day 0 on this axis refers to a policy that is in place even before the first introduction of a pandemic influenza strain into the United States.) Clearly, an early intervention has benefits by reducing both the incidence rate and the demand on the limited antiviral supply.
In the event (or even the threat) of a nascent pandemic, a major challenge will be to correctly distinguish patients with the pandemic influenza strain from the larger we have also carried out a few simulations with a two-day lag between the appearance of symptoms and the antiviral treatment and close-contact prophylaxis, as shown in Table 8 for an 80% TAP intervention.
Finally, Table 9 compares the 60% and 80% TAP programs, indicating the need for both early intervention (as seen in Fig. 10 ) and for a high identification rate. For instance, a nascent pandemic outbreak with R 0 = 1.9 can be contained with only 27 million courses if an 80% TAP strategy is implemented as late as 7 days after the pandemic alert threshold (starting 3 days earlier, at 4 days after the alert, only requires 20 million courses), which is within the planned national antiviral stockpile. However, a 60% TAP program initiated at the same time is moderately successful, but consumes 182 million courses, currently a prohibitively large supply of antivirals. We also find that it is important to be able to ascertain close contacts beyond the household, including school and work group peers and household clusters; 60% TAP with only prophylaxis of the household uses few courses, but with a significantly higher total attack rate.
(5) Social distancing strategies, including travel restrictions
As discussed in the main text, all of the social distancing strategies we have examined only serve to slow down the epidemic spread, but are ineffective at reducing the overall attack rate (shown in Table 9 for a combination of all social distancing measures). For the example of long-distance travel restrictions, this was discussed in Section E(2) for the static one-time introduction of infecteds into Los Angeles (Fig. 8) , and is illustrated in Fig. 11 and Table 9 for the usual daily introduction through airport hubs, for R 0 = 1.9 and 2.4. Although the final national attack rates are virtually unaffected, drastic reductions in long-range travel to 1-10% of the normal rates clearly spreads out the pandemic into two waves: after an initial peak in the sites of introduction (which occurs at the same time as
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(6) Combined mitigation strategies Table 10 shows results for several combinations of the mitigation strategies, both therapeutic (vaccines and/or antivirals) and social distancing (including school closure and travel restrictions). The key ingredients of any response plan seem to include both TAP and school closure if a pandemic with potential R 0 as high as 2.4 is to be avoided, although one of these measures (but not both) may be omitted if R 0 < 2.1.
F. Simulation Movies
All movies are single realizations for R 0 = 1.9, with the standard daily introduction of infected people through 14 major international airports, as described above. As in Fig. 1 of the main article text, each census tract is shown as a dot colored according to the current prevalence, on a logarithmic scale from green for 0.03% or fewer ill people per capita, to red for 3% or greater. The corresponding epidemic curves (averaged over the entire nation) are also shown in the right panels.
(1) Baseline scenario, without any intervention. Table 9 . Various intervention runs aimed at examining the sensitivity of results presented in Table 2 Table 7 ). realizations, and the number of secondary cases is counted for each realization. The frequency distribution is shown here, which produces the overall average, R 0 = 1.77 for a transmission probability P trans = 0.12. As seen in Table 7 , the estimated R 0 is increased by 5-8% by taking into account an attack rate weighted index case or estimating R 0 by the slope of the cumulative number of cases, respectively. Table 7 and bottom panel). (Bottom) The age specific cumulative attack rate normalized by the overall cumulative attack rate during the course of an epidemic in an ensemble of 500 isolated communities initially seeded with 12 random index cases. The transmission probability is 0.12, corresponding to R 0 =1.6. It can be seen that school-age children become ill first, which boosts the overall R 0 for about 20 days, since the reproductive number for this age group is larger than for all other age groups (see Table 7 ). 
